polygon cdk 查看最新提交L1batch num

2024-11-18 11:27:35

通过RPC

curl http://L2RPC访问地址/ \
  -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"method":"zkevm_virtualBatchNumber","params":[],"id":1,"jsonrpc":"2.0"}'

例如返回

 curl http://172.18.39.103:8123/ \
>   -X POST \
>   -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
>   --data '{"method":"zkevm_virtualBatchNumber","params":[],"id":1,"jsonrpc":"2.0"}'
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":"0x52"}

0x52对应10进制为82
https://tool.lu/hexconvert/

合约逻辑

function sequenceBatchesValidium(
        ValidiumBatchData[] calldata batches,
        uint32 l1InfoTreeLeafCount,
        uint64 maxSequenceTimestamp,
        bytes32 expectedFinalAccInputHash,
        address l2Coinbase,
        bytes calldata dataAvailabilityMessage
    ) external onlyTrustedSequencer {
        uint256 batchesNum = batches.length;
        if (batchesNum == 0) {
            revert SequenceZeroBatches();
        }

        if (batchesNum > _MAX_VERIFY_BATCHES) {
            revert ExceedMaxVerifyBatches();
        }

        // Check max sequence timestamp inside of range
        if (
            uint256(maxSequenceTimestamp) > (block.timestamp + TIMESTAMP_RANGE)
        ) {
            revert MaxTimestampSequenceInvalid();
        }

        // Update global exit root if there are new deposits
        bridgeAddress.updateGlobalExitRoot();

        // Get global batch variables
        bytes32 l1InfoRoot = globalExitRootManager.l1InfoRootMap(
            l1InfoTreeLeafCount
        );

        if (l1InfoRoot == bytes32(0)) {
            revert L1InfoTreeLeafCountInvalid();
        }

        // Store storage variables in memory, to save gas, because will be overrided multiple times
        uint64 currentLastForceBatchSequenced = lastForceBatchSequenced;
        bytes32 currentAccInputHash = lastAccInputHash;

        // Store in a temporal variable, for avoid access again the storage slot
        uint64 initLastForceBatchSequenced = currentLastForceBatchSequenced;

        for (uint256 i = 0; i < batchesNum; i++) {
            // Load current sequence
            ValidiumBatchData memory currentBatch = batches[i];

            // Check if it's a forced batch
            if (currentBatch.forcedTimestamp > 0) {
                currentLastForceBatchSequenced++;

                // Check forced data matches
                bytes32 hashedForcedBatchData = keccak256(
                    abi.encodePacked(
                        currentBatch.transactionsHash,
                        currentBatch.forcedGlobalExitRoot,
                        currentBatch.forcedTimestamp,
                        currentBatch.forcedBlockHashL1
                    )
                );

                if (
                    hashedForcedBatchData !=
                    forcedBatches[currentLastForceBatchSequenced]
                ) {
                    revert ForcedDataDoesNotMatch();
                }

                // Calculate next accumulated input hash
                currentAccInputHash = keccak256(
                    abi.encodePacked(
                        currentAccInputHash,
                        currentBatch.transactionsHash,
                        currentBatch.forcedGlobalExitRoot,
                        currentBatch.forcedTimestamp,
                        l2Coinbase,
                        currentBatch.forcedBlockHashL1
                    )
                );

                // Delete forceBatch data since won't be used anymore
                delete forcedBatches[currentLastForceBatchSequenced];
            } else {
                // Note that forcedGlobalExitRoot and forcedBlockHashL1 remain unused and unchecked in this path
                // The synchronizer should be aware of that

                // Calculate next accumulated input hash
                currentAccInputHash = keccak256(
                    abi.encodePacked(
                        currentAccInputHash,
                        currentBatch.transactionsHash,
                        l1InfoRoot,
                        maxSequenceTimestamp,
                        l2Coinbase,
                        bytes32(0)
                    )
                );
            }
        }

        // Sanity check, should be unreachable
        if (currentLastForceBatchSequenced > lastForceBatch) {
            revert ForceBatchesOverflow();
        }

        // Store back the storage variables
        lastAccInputHash = currentAccInputHash;

        uint256 nonForcedBatchesSequenced = batchesNum;

        // Check if there has been forced batches
        if (currentLastForceBatchSequenced != initLastForceBatchSequenced) {
            uint64 forcedBatchesSequenced = currentLastForceBatchSequenced -
                initLastForceBatchSequenced;
            // substract forced batches
            nonForcedBatchesSequenced -= forcedBatchesSequenced;

            // Transfer pol for every forced batch submitted
            pol.safeTransfer(
                address(rollupManager),
                calculatePolPerForceBatch() * (forcedBatchesSequenced)
            );

            // Store new last force batch sequenced
            lastForceBatchSequenced = currentLastForceBatchSequenced;
        }

        // Pay collateral for every non-forced batch submitted
        if (nonForcedBatchesSequenced != 0) {
            pol.safeTransferFrom(
                msg.sender,
                address(rollupManager),
                rollupManager.getBatchFee() * nonForcedBatchesSequenced
            );

            // Validate that the data availability protocol accepts the dataAvailabilityMessage
            // note This is a view function, so there's not much risk even if this contract was vulnerable to reentrant attacks
            dataAvailabilityProtocol.verifyMessage(
                expectedFinalAccInputHash,
                dataAvailabilityMessage
            );
        }

        uint64 currentBatchSequenced = rollupManager.onSequenceBatches(
            uint64(batchesNum),
            currentAccInputHash
        );

        // Check expectedFinalAccInputHash
        if (currentAccInputHash != expectedFinalAccInputHash) {
            revert FinalAccInputHashDoesNotMatch();
        }

        emit SequenceBatches(currentBatchSequenced, l1InfoRoot);
    }

查看举例交易:https://sepolia.etherscan.io/tx/0xdb8636d8853348d4d48df1d602a3ce6fe8c37c6be3c30ea9d83f2568e7562fa1#eventlog
对应事件:SequenceBatches

最新提交batch num: 82 与RPC 查询数据一致

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